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Abstract. In the present article we consider the conjunction fallacy, a well known
cognitive heuristic experimentally tested in cognitive science, which occurs for intuitive
judgments in situations of bounded rationality. We show that the quantum formalism
can be used to describe in a very simple way this fallacy in terms of interference
effect. We evidence that the quantum formalism leads quite naturally to violations
of Bayes’ rule when considering the estimated probability of the conjunction of two
events. By defining the concept of maximal conjunction error, we find a good agreement
with experimental results. Thus we suggest that in cognitive science the formalism of
quantum mechanics can be used to describe a quantum regime, the bounded-rationality
regime, where the cognitive heuristics are valid.
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1. Introduction
This article addresses two main directions of research: the investigation of how the
quantum formalism is compatible with Bayes’ rule of classic probability theory, and
the attempt to describe with the quantum formalism systems and situations very
different from the microscopic particles. A number of attempts have been done to
apply the formalism of quantum mechanics to domains of science different from the
micro-world with applications to economics [1], operations research and management
sciences [2] and [3], psychology and cognition [4] and [5], game theory [6], and language
and artificial intelligence [7]. Quantum mechanics, for its counterintuitive predictions,
seems to provide a good formalism to describe puzzling effects of contextuality. In
the present article, we try to describe within the quantum formalism an important
heuristic of cognitive science, the conjunction fallacy [8, 9]. This heuristic is valid
in regime of bounded rationality, which is characterized by cognitive limitations of
both knowledge and cognitive capacity. Bounded rationality [10] is a central theme
in behavioral economics and psychology and it is concerned with the ways in which
the actual decision-making process influences agents’ decisions. Previous attempts to
describe features connected with this heuristic in terms of quantum formalism have been
done in [12] and in [13].
This article is organized in order to be readable both from quantum physicists
and from experts of cognitive science. In section 2 we introduce the basic notation of
quantum mechanics, and we show in 2.3 that the quantum formalism describing two non-
commuting observables leads to violations of Bayes’ rule. In section 3 we describe the
answers to a question in bounded-rationality regime in terms of vector state and density
matrix of the quantum formalism. Finally, in section 4 we show how the quantum
formalism can naturally describe the conjunction fallacy, and in section 6 we try to
describe with the quantum formalism other fallacies
The main results of this article are: 1) tests on non-commuting observables lead
to violations of Bayes’ rule; 2) the opinion-state of an agent for simple questions with
only two possible answers can be represented, in bounded-rationality regime, by a qubit
state; 3) the different questions in bounded-rationality regime can be formally written
as operators acting on the qubit states; 4) the explicit answer of an agent to a question
in regime of bounded rationality can be described as a collapse of the opinion state onto
an eigenvector of the corresponding operator; 5) the estimated probability relevant to a
question A, when analyzed in terms of the probability relevant to a second question B
(corresponding to a non-commuting operator) evidences the violation of Bayes’ rule. The
conjunction fallacy thus results as a consequence of this general fact. 6) The predictions
of the model are consistent with the experimental tests on conjunction fallacy.
In conclusion, we present a very general and abstract formalism which seems to
describe the heuristic of conjunction fallacy. We think that a similar study can be
done for other heuristics of cognitive science (this will be presented in new papers).
Thus these heuristics could be simple applications of a general theory describing the
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bounded-rationality regime, which probably will lead to new interesting predictions.
This could confirm the hypothesis that the processes of intuitive judgement could involve
mechanisms at a quantum level in the brain.
2. Quantum basic formalism
We first introduce the standard bra-ket notation usually used in quantum mechanics,
introduced by Dirac [14], and then the density matrix formalism. In particular, we
focus our attention on the concept of qubit. In the simplest situation, a quantum state
is defined by a ket |s〉, which is a vector in a complex separable Hilbert space H . If
the dimension of H is 2, the state describes a qubit, which is the unit of quantum
information. Any quantum system prepared identically to |s〉 is described by the same
ket |s〉.
In quantum mechanics, we call a measurable quantity an observable, mathematically
described by an operator, for example Â, with the important requirement that it is
hermitian: Â = Â†, where Â† is the conjugate transpose. In the case of a single qubit,
any observable Â has two real eigenvalues a0 and a1 and two corresponding eigenvectors
|a0〉 and |a1〉. Another property of hermitian operators is that its eigenvectors, if
normalized, form an orthonormal basis, that is
〈ai|aj〉 = δ(i, j) , (1)
where i, j = 0, 1 and δ(i, j) is the Kroneker delta, equal to 1 if i = j and null otherwise.
Given such a basis in the Hilbert space, we can write them in components as
|a0〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |a1〉 =
(
0
1
)
, (2)
representing the quantum analogue to the two possible values 0 and 1 of a classical
bit. An important difference is that in the quantum case a state can be in a linear
superposition of 0 and 1, that is
|s〉 = s0|a0〉+ s1|a1〉 , (3)
with s0 and s1 complex numbers. We also say that the state |s〉 is a superposition of
the eigenstates |ai〉. In the vector representation generated by formula (2) in the chosen
basis, the ket |s〉 and its dual vector, the bra 〈s|, can be written respectively as
|s〉 =
(
s0
s1
)
, 〈s| =
(
s∗0 s
∗
1
)
. (4)
Another mathematical object, which is important in order to describe probabilities, is
the inner product, also called braket. In general, the inner product of two kets |s〉 and
|s′〉 can be written, in the basis of the obsevable Â, as 〈s|s′〉 = s0s
′
0
∗ + s1s
′
1
∗, where s′i
are the components of |s′〉 in the same basis. Thus the inner product of |s〉 and its dual
vector is 〈s|s〉 = |s0|
2 + |s1|
2, and it is equal to 1 if the vector is normalized. Finally,
|si|
2 = |〈ai|s〉|
2 is the probability P (ai) that the measure on the observable Â has the
outcome i = 0, 1. The state |s〉 is called a pure state, and describes a quantum state for
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which the preparation is complete: all the information which can be theorically provided
have been used.
In the most general case, a quantum state is described by the density matrix ρ̂,
which is an hermitian operator acting on H . The density matrix ρ̂ describes in general
a mixed state, that is a state for which the preparation is not completely determined.
For example, the state may be in the preparation |s1〉 with a probability P1, and in the
preparation |s2〉 with a probability P2 (the two vectors may be not orthogonal). We
also say that the the mixed state is a (statistical) mixture of the two states (or of the
two preparations):
ρ̂ =
∑
i
Pi|si〉〈si| . (5)
In the particular case where there is only one Pi = 1, we have ρ̂ = |s〉〈s|, that is a pure
state: thus the density matrix of a pure state is a projector. The opposite situation is
when the eigenvalues of the density matrix are all equal. In the single-qubit example,
they are both 1/2, and the resulting operator is the identity matrix acting on the Hilbert
space H :
ρ̂ =
1
2
Î =
1
2
[
1 0
0 1
]
. (6)
The resulting state is called maximally mixed, and can be considered as the situation
where the actual knowledge of the state is null.
2.1. Probability and mean value
The elements of the single-qubit density matrix ρ̂ can be expressed in the basis of Â,
with i, j = 0, 1, as
ρi,j = 〈ai|ρ̂|aj〉 . (7)
where the diagonal elements ρi,i represent the probability P (ai) to measure a certain
value ai of the relevant observable. An equivalent expression of these probabilities can
be written in terms of the trace-matrix operation:
P (ai) = Tr(ρ̂|ai〉〈ai|) = ρi,i (8)
This formula is the most general expression of the probability to measure a value ai
of an observable, when operating on quantum systems identically prepared in the state
ρ̂. The formalism of the density matrix helps us to write in the most general form the
mean value of an observable Â as
〈Â〉 = Tr(ρ̂Â) , (9)
which becomes, by using formula (7) and the basis vectors of Â, 〈Â〉 =
∑
i aiP (ai).
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2.2. Collapse of the state vector
One of the axioms [14] of quantum mechanics states that, given an initial mixed state
ρ̂ and an observable Â acting on a discrete Hilbert space, we can define from the
eigenvectors {|ai〉} of Â the projection operators {|ai〉〈ai|}, where for a single qubit
i = 0, 1. Thus if the measure of the observable Â is the eigenvalue ai, the state updates
as
ρ̂ → |ai〉〈ai| (10)
This general formula is valid for an orthonormal basis {|ai〉}, and defines the collapse of
the initial state onto the state vector |ai〉. Of course, after the measurement, a suitable
unitary operation can change the resulting (collapsed) state. At a first analysis, the
collapse of the state may seem quite obvious. In fact, the initial probability distribution
P (aj) given by equation (8) corresponding to the initial state ρ̂, changes, by performing
simple calculations, into
P (aj)→ δ(ai, aj) . (11)
This means that, after measuring a certain value ai of Â, the probability that the
observable actually has another value aj 6= ai is null. This fact is valid also in classic
probability theory. Nevertheless, we will show in the next subsection that the collapse
leads to violation of classic laws of probability theory when considering more than one
observable.
2.3. Non-commuting operators and Bayes’ rule
In quantum mechanics the operators associated to the observables may not commute:
for example, given two operators Â and B̂, acting on the same Hilbert space H , the
ordered product ÂB̂ can be different from B̂Â: in this case the two operators do not
commute and we write [Â, B̂] 6= 0, where [Â, B̂] = ÂB̂ − B̂Â is the commutator of the
two observables. The consequences of this fact are very important, and lead to violation
of Bayes’ rule. Let us consider for simplicity a single-quit system and the eigenvectors
{|ai〉} and {|bi〉} of Â and B̂ respectively (with i = 0, 1). The probability of measuring
the value ai or bi for the observables Â or B̂ respectively is given by equation (8), that
is:
P (ai) = Tr(ρ̂|ai〉〈ai|); P (bi) = Tr(ρ̂|bi〉〈bi|) . (12)
We now consider the conditional probability P (bj|ai), defined as the probability to
measure the observable B̂ with value bj , given the occurrence of a measurement of Â
with value ai. In quantum mechanics, the occurrence of a measurement of Â with
result ai means that the actual state is |ai〉, independently from the initial state before
the measurement. This is a consequence of the quantum collapse, and leads to many
differences from the classic case. In quantum mechanics thus we have that
P (bj|ai) = |〈bj |ai〉|
2 = P (ai|bj) . (13)
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Conditional probabilities in quantum mechanics have other particular features: from
the resolution of identity |a0〉〈a0| + |a0〉〈a0| = I (where I is the identity matrix), we
have that P (b1|a0) + P (b1|a1) = 1 and P (b0|a0) + P (b0|a1) = 1, from which we have
in general that P (b0|a0) = P (b1|a1) and P (b1|a0) = P (b0|a1). These properties are not
valid in general in classic probability theory, and can be responsible of the inverse fallacy
[16]. In classical probability theory two observables are statistically independent when
P (bj|ai) = P (bj): in the quantum formalism this is impossible in general.
Let us now consider the Bayes’ rule, which defines the joint probability to measure
contemporarily the values ai and bj for observables A and B respectively:
P (ai)P (bj|ai) = P (bj)P (ai|bj) = P (ai, bj) . (14)
This equation is very important in classical probability theory, since it links the joint
probabilities relevant to Â and B̂ to the conditional probabilities. In quantum mechanics
one can not measure contemporarily two non-commuting operators. This means that
the joint probability P (ai, bj) can not be univocally defined. What we can rigorously
define is
P (ai → bj) = P (ai)P (bj |ai) , (15)
where P (ai → bj) is the probability to measure ai for the observable Â and then the
answer bj for the observable B̂. We call P (ai → bj) the consecutive probability to measure
ai and then bj . From a formal point of view, the impossibility to define univocally a
joint probability is evidenced from the fact that, by using the equations (12) and (13),
we have in general that
P (ai → bj) 6= P (bj → ai) (16)
Equation (16) evidences that in quantum mechanics the Bayes’ rule is violated. Many
of the paradoxical results of quantum mechanics are due to this violation. In the present
article, we will focus our attention on the conjunction fallacy, which we will study in
the next sections.
3. Bounded rationality and Hilbert spaces
The bounded rationality [10] is a property of an agent (a person which makes decisions)
that behaves in a manner that is nearly optimal with respect to its goals and resources.
In general, an agent acts in bounded-rationality regime when there is a limited time
in which to make decisions, or when he is also limited by schemas and other decisional
limitations. As a result, the decisions are not fully thought through and they are rational
only within limits such as time and cognitive capability. There are two major causes
of bounded rationality, the limitations of the human mind, and the structure within
which the mind operates. This impacts decision models that assume us to be fully
rational: for example when calculating expected utility, it happens that people do not
make the best choices. Since the effects of bounded rationality are counterintuitive and
may violate the classical probability theory (and the Bayes’ rule), we will often speak
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of bounded-rationality regime as the set of situations where the bounded rationality is
an actual property.
We will show that some typical behaviors of the bounded-rationality regime can be
described in a very effective way by the quantum formalism. We will study the opinion
state of agents having the same initial information in terms of estimated probabilities.
In particular, we will assume that the opinion state of an agent can be represented as
a qubit state, that is in terms of a density matrix ρ̂ or, in simple cases, of a ket |s〉 in a
Hilbert space H of dimension 2. As in quantum mechanics experiments, it is important
to define carefully the preparation of the opinion state. Any previous information given
to an agent before performing a test can be considered as the preparation of the opinion
state. When we repeat a test on more agents, it is important that their opinion state is
(at least in theory) identically prepared. We note here that it is not easy to prepare the
opinion state of a number of people in an identical state. Nevertheless, the quantum
formalism can help us with the concept of mixed state.
The basic test in the context of bounded rationality is a question. We consider
a question A for which the possible answers can only be 0 or 1 (false or true), and
we associate it to an operator Â acting on the Hilbert space H . Like in quantum
mechanics, the question A is an observable, in the sense that we can observe an answer:
thus, when speaking of questions, we will consider directly the associated operator Â.
The answers 0 and 1 are associated to the eigenvalues a0 = 0 and a1 = 1 of Â, while
the eigenvectors |a0〉 and |a1〉 correspond to the opinion states relevant to the answers
0 and 1 respectively:
Â|a0〉 = 0|a0〉 = 0; Â|a1〉 = |a1〉 . (17)
The eigenvectors |a0〉 and |a1〉 have a very precise meaning: if the opinion state of an
agent can be described for example by |a1〉, this means that the answer to the question Â
is 1 with certainty. If we repeat the same question to many agents in the same opinion
state (thus identically prepared), each agent will give the same answer 1. If instead
the opinion state about the question is definitely 0, then we have the eigenvector |a0〉.
Any observable can be written in the basis of its eigenvectors as Â =
∑
i ai|ai〉〈ai|.
A superposition of the opinion states |ai〉 about question Â is, like in equation (3),
|s〉 = s0|a0〉+ s1|a1〉, where |si|
2 = |〈ai|s〉|
2 is the probability P (ai) that the agent gives
an answer i = 0, 1 to the question Â. In the most general case, the opinion state can
be represented as a density matrix ρ̂. The probability that the answer to the question
Â is ai is given by equation (8): P (ai) = Tr(ρ|ai〉〈ai|).
We note that the formalism introduced is the same used to describe questions
in regime of rational ignorance [3], where people choose to remain uninformed about
a question Â. In fact, the bounded rationality can be considered as a more general
situation than the rational ignorance, where the question is preceded by some additional
information.
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4. The conjunction fallacy
The conjunction fallacy is a well known cognitive heuristic which occurs in bounded
rationality when some specific conditions are assumed to be more probable than the
general ones. More precisely, many people tend to ascribe higher probabilities to the
conjunction of two events than to one of the single events. The most often-cited example
of this fallacy found by Tversky and Kahneman [8] is the case of Linda, which we will
consider carefully in the present article. The test is preceded by a brief personality
sketch: Linda was a philosophy major. She is bright and concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice. After this preparation, the agents are asked if they
judge more probable that Linda is a bank teller or a feminist bank teller. The surprising
result is that subjects judge more probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than a
bank teller, even if this is in contrast with classical probability theory.
According to Tversky and Kahneman, the explanation of this fallacy is that subjects
assess Linda to be more typical of feminist bank teller than of bank teller, and that this
assessment influences their probability judgments. As Kahneman and Tversky have
repeatedly pointed out, however, the intuition of typicality differs structurally from
the mathematical properties of a classic probability measure. There is no fallacy in
considering Linda more typical of a feminist bank teller than of bank teller, there is only
a conjunction effect. The conjunction fallacy instead lies in equating the probability
order to the typicality order. A more thorough test of the similarity hypothesis has
been described in [9]: the stimuli were 14 brief personality sketches, one of which was
the Linda sketch and others of which were new. For each sketch, they constructed
an incompatible conjunction, A-and-B, and a compatible conjunction, A-and-C, such
that A was the same representative outcome for both conjunctions (e.g., Linda is a
feminist), B was an unrepresentative outcome (e.g., Linda is a bank teller), and C was
a representative outcome (e.g., Linda is a teacher). In terms of the Linda example,
A-and-B would be ”Linda is a feminist bank teller” and A-and-C would be ”Linda is
a feminist teacher.” One sample of subjects rated the typicality of the propositions,
B/A-and-B, C/A-and-C, and a different sample of subjects rated the probability of
these same propositions. The result is that exists a positive correlation between the
conjunction effect (involving the typicality) and the conjunction fallacy (involving the
probability).
The main competitors to the representativeness explanation of conjunction errors
are various probability combination models. The simplest weighted averaging model
asserts that P (A,B) = v1P (A)+v2P (B
v1+v2
, where v1 and v2 are positive weights (Wyer,
1976). A modified version of this model uses belief strengths, and not probabilities.
However, the main feature of this model is that it leads to P (A) > P (A,B) > P (B).
These combination models have been modified in order to avoid some inconsistencies
of the model with the experiments. Yates and Carlson ([20]) proposed an alternative
theory of conjunction errors according to which these errors result from the application
of improper mental rules when combining the probabilities of individual propositions.
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The results of Table III show that conjunction errors may occur also when events A
and B are semantically unrelated: it is difficult to see how the judged probability
of the conjunction could be based on the representativeness, i.e., the typicality, of
the conceptual combination. Thus they proposed a signed summation model where
the belief strength of a conjunction is a sum of the strengths of its components
S(A,B) = S(A)+S(B), (the belief strength scale S is allowed to take on either positive
or negative values). This model seem to be the most similar to our quantum explanation.
In general, we consider two dichotomous questions A and B, with possible answers
a0, a1 and b0, b1. The typical experiments of [8] and [9] consist in a preparation of the
opinion state, which provides some information to the agent, and the following question:
what is more probable or frequent between a1 and a1-and-b1? The agents manifest in
all these experiments a strict preference for the answer a1-and-b1: this evidences the
conjunction fallacy, since the Bayes’ rule (14) entails that
P (b1) = P (a0)P (b1|a0) + P (a1)P (b1|a1) ≥ P (a1)P (b1|a1) . (18)
In other words, the conjunction of two events a1 and b1 is always less probable than of
one of two events. Nonetheless, the agents often consider more likely a1-and-b1 than a1.
We now introduce the quantum formalism in order to show that the conjunction
fallacy can be described and interpreted in such a formalism. In particular, we consider
two operators Â and B̂, associated respectively to the questions A and B. Since A and
B are dichotomous questions, we can describe the opinion state of agents as vectors in a
two-dimensional Hilbert space. Both the eigenvectors of Â and B̂, defined by equation
(17), form two orthonormal bases of the Hilbert space H . Thus we can express the
eigenvectors of Â in the basis of the eigenvectors of B̂, obtaining the general equations:
|a0〉 = e
iξ
√
P (b1|a1)|b0〉+ e
iφ
√
P (b1|a0)|b1〉 (19)
|a1〉 = −e
−iφ
√
P (b1|a0)|b0〉+ e
−iξ
√
P (b1|a1)|b1〉 ,
and vice-versa
|b0〉 = e
−iξ
√
P (b1|a1)|a0〉 − e
iφ
√
P (b1|a0)|a1〉 (20)
|b1〉 = e
−iφ
√
P (b1|a0)|a0〉+ e
iξ
√
P (b1|a1)|a1〉 .
The transformations above are a change of basis, which can be described in terms of a
special unitary operator Û (which preserves the normalization) such that
∑
ij Uij |ai〉 =
|bj〉. The transformation is defined uniquely by the three independent parameters
P (b1|a1), φ and ξ: in fact the other parameter P (b1|a0) = 1−P (b1|a1) is not independent,
as noted in section (2.3). The parameters φ and ξ are useful when considering pure states
and are important in interference effects.
Let us now consider as the initial state the following superposition
|s〉 =
√
P (a0)|a0〉+ e
iφa
√
P (a1)|a1〉 (21)
where φa represents the phase relevant to the superposition of the vectors |ai〉. This pure
state describes correctly the probabilities for Â, P (ai) = |〈s|ai〉|
2. By using equation
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(19), we can express this state in the basis of B̂, obtaining
|s〉 = (22)
[
√
P (a0)
√
P (b1|a1)e
iξ −
√
P (a1)
√
P (b1|a0)e
i(φa−φ)]|b0〉+
[
√
P (a0)
√
P (b1|a0)e
iφ +
√
P (a1)
√
P (b1|a1)e
i(φa−ξ)]|b1〉.
We now consider the probabilities P (a1), P (b1) and the conditional probability
P (a1|b1): from equation (22), we have that P (b1) is |
√
P (a0)
√
P (b1|a0)e
iφ +√
P (a1)
√
P (b1|a1)e
i(φa−ξ)|2, obtaining
P (b1) = P (a0)P (b1|a0) + P (a1)P (b1|a1) + (23)
2
√
P (a0)P (a1)P (b1|a0)P (b1|a1)cos(φ+ ξ − φa)
The presence of the last term, known as the interference term I(s, A) can produce
conjunction fallacy effects: in fact, if we impose that P (a0)P (b1|a0) + I(s, A) < 0, we
have P (b1) < P (a1)P (b1|a1). Thus the sign and the weight of the interference term can
determine the conjunction fallacy, while the parameter φ+ ξ−φa can give to this effect
more or less strength. A positive interference term enhances the prevalence of P (b1) on
P (a1, b1), which can be considered a reverse conjunction fallacy.
It must be noted that the quantum explanation of the conjunction fallacy evidences
that the interference term can make P (b1) lower than P (a1)P (b1|a1) = P (a1 → b1). On
the contrary, P (b1) is always greater than P (b1)P (a1|b1) = P (b1 → a1). Thus we add
the hypothesis that, when agents have to judge the probabilities of b1 and a1-and-b1,
they first consider the element that differences the two situations (a1) and then the
composite situation. This hypothesis is able to explain why the agents compare in their
judgements P (b1) and P (a1 → b1).
The conjunction fallacy can appear also when comparing a1 and a1-and-b1, if we
write the same initial state in the basis of B̂
|s〉 =
√
P (b0)|b0〉+ e
iφb
√
P (b1)|b1〉 (24)
The probability P (a1) can be written, with similar calculations, as
P (a1) = P (b0)P (a1|b0) + P (b1)P (a1|b1)− (25)
2
√
P (b0)P (b1)P (a1|b0)P (a1|b1)cos(φ− ξ − φb)
evidencing once again an interference term I(s, B). If we want the presence of
conjunction fallacy P (a1) < P (b1)P (a1|b1), we impose P (b0)P (a1|b0) + I(s, B) < 0.
We thus define the conjunction error as
∆(A,B, s) = P (a0)P (b1|a0) + (26)
2
√
P (a0)P (a1)P (b1|a0)P (b1|a1)cos(φ+ ξ − φa) < 0
∆(B,A, s) = P (b0)P (a1|b0)− (27)
2
√
P (b0)P (b1)P (a1|b0)P (a1|b1)cos(φ− ξ − φb) < 0
If the both the conditions (26) and (27) are verified, we have a double conjunction
fallacy.
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5. Experimental results
The model we have developed, once we know the independent parameters P (a1),
P (a1|b1), φ + ξ − φa, allows to predict with certainty if there is or not a conjunction
fallacy. However the experimental results evidence that not all the agents manifest a
conjunction fallacy, which can be associated to a probability. This can be explained with
the fact that in general we have an incomplete preparation of the opinion state, which
determines a mixed state: we could have some agents into a state |s1〉 with probability
P1 and some other agents into the state |s2〉 with probability P2, etc... The resulting
opinion state is in general a mixed state ρ =
∑
i Pi|si〉 where each |si〉 can have different
P (a1) and φa. We thus have different types of interference terms, determining in an
independent way the conjunction fallacy with probabilities Pi respectively.
We define the mean conjunction error ∆mean(A,B) =
∑
i∆(A,B, si)Pi: it could
be null, even if some agents may manifest the conjunction fallacy, meaning that the
perceived compatibility of two events is not similar for the agents in the experiment.
We can decompose the density matrix into ρ =
∑
i P
′
i |s
′
i〉〈s
′
i|+
∑
j P
′′
j |s
′′
j 〉〈s
′′
j | where
the states |s′i〉 manifest conjunction fallacy, while the others do not manifest it. Thus the
probability that an agent will exhibit a conjunction fallacy, being prepared in the state
ρ, is
∑
i P
′
i . In the next subsections, we will investigate the mean conjunction errors
and the probability of conjunction errors. In particular, we consider the probabilities
P (a1)/P (b1) with the following couples: HH, HL, LH, LL, where H means that the
corresponding probability is high (> 0.5), while L is low (< 0.5). For example the
couple HH describes a situation where both P (a1) and P (b1) are > 0.5.
5.1. Mean conjunction error
One of the main experimental results in the tests of the conjunction fallacy is the
mean conjunction error P (a1, b1)− P (b1): in [9] it is found that there are greater mean
conjunction errors in situations HL than in HH. In particular, the maximal error reported
in [9] (table I) for HL is 0.27, while for HH is 0.09. These experimental results of [9]
can be explained in the following way: we define the condition of maximal conjunction
error compatible with the parameters P (a1) and P (b1|a1) the values of φ+ ξ − φa such
that cos(φ + ξ − φa) = −1. By imposing the maximal conjunction error condition we
obtain the equation
∆max(A,B) = P (a0)P (b1|a0)− 2
√
P (a0)P (a1)P (b1|a0)P (b1|a1) < 0 (28)
where ∆max(A,B) is the maximal conjunction error. This difference is a measure of the
strength of the maximal conjunction error compatible with the parameters P (a1) and
P (b1|a1), which may be lowered by different relative phase factor. In figure 1 we show
the maximal conjunction error for three different values of P (b1|a1) (0.1, 0.5 and 0.9).
We note that high/low values of P (b1|a1) entail a correlation/anticorrelation between
P (a1) and P (b1) respectively.
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Figure 1. Maximal conjunction errors for three different values of P (b1|a1)
Moreover, condition (28) and figure 1 entail that the combination LH does not
manifest conjunction errors (the maximal conjunction error is positive in the left part of
the left panel in figure 1), while the other couples allow for conjunction errors. HH and
LL couples produce lower maximal errors (0.17 and 0.23 respectively) than HL couples
(0.3).
Now we consider the effect of the phase factor cos(φ+ξ−φa): the conjunction error
can be lowered (negative factor), or can it be deleted (null or positive factor). Thus the
factor cos(φ+ ξ − φa) can be interpreted as a psychologic parameter of the the opinion
state of agents which describes how two events are considered antithetical. For example,
if two events are considered antithetical, we have a strongly negative interference term.
Our description could be connected to the concept of incompatibility of two events,
introduced by [9]: two events are incompatible when we have a situation HL and the
phase factor is negative. It is important to distinguish this kind of incompatibility
from the incompatibility of quantum observables (that is the non-commutativity). It
is important to note that the phase factor, because of its psychologic nature may be
extremely variable even for similar preparations.
Thus the results of [9] can be explained by noting that for HL couples the predicted
maximal conjunction error (0.3) can be slightly lowered by the phase factor in order
to be similar to the results of [9] (0.27). Analogously, for HH situations the maximal
conjunction error predicted by the model (0.17) is lowered by the phase factor in order
to be similar to the experimental value 0.9. We conclude that the phase factor is more
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similar to -1 in the HL case, confirming that the two events are considered antithetically.
The case LH, according to our model, does not produce conjunction error, even
without the effect of the phase factor. This seems to be in accordance with experimental
results, even if there is no general agreement about this fact.
5.2. Percentage of conjunction errors
Differently form [9], the papers [8, 20] study the percentage of agents which judge
P (a1, b1) greater than P (b1). In [20] it is found that the fraction of agents that exhibit
single conjunction errors is greater for HL situations (0.67) than for HH and LL (0.15 and
0.27 respectively). On the contrary, double conjunction errors happen more frequently
for HH (0.30).
Our formalism can explain these results by decomposing the density matrix into
ρ =
∑
i P
′
i |s
′
i〉 +
∑
j P
′′
j |s
′′
j 〉 where the states |s
′
i〉 manifest conjunction fallacy, while the
others do not manifest it. Thus the probability that an agent will exhibit a conjunction
fallacy, being prepared in the state ρ, is
∑
i P
′
i . This means that in HL situations the
states involved in the mixed state evidence strongly negative phase factor with more
probability than for HH and LL, consistently with the results for the mean conjunction
errors.
We now consider the occurrence of double conjunction errors, which means that
P (b1) < P (a1 → b1) and P (a1) < P (b1 → a1). Equation (25) entails a condition of
maximal conjunction error similar to equation (28), that is
∆max(B,A) = P (b0)P (a1|b0)− 2
√
P (a1)P (b1)P (a1|b1)P (b1|a1) < 0 (29)
This condition entails that the allowed couples of probability P (a1)/P (b1) for which
there is a not-null maximal conjunction error is HH, LH and LL. Thus the conditions
HL and LH do not allow for double conjunction errors. This can explain the results
presented in [19, 20], where several probability combination models for conjunction
errors are presented: double conjunction errors can not occur simultaneously for HL or
LH situations (maximal percentage 4.5%).
5.3. Numerical example
We consider again the example of Linda, by considering two questions A: is Linda
feminist? and B: is Linda a bankteller? for which the experiments indicate a probability
P (b1) = 0.241 and P (a1)P (b1|a1) = 0.439. Moreover, we know that P (a1) is high, since
the description of Linda is very representative of a feminist. In the quantum formalism,
there are many different states describing such a situation.
If we consider the pure state
√
P (a0)|a0〉 + e
iφa
√
P (a1)|a1〉, we can choose the
parameters P (a1) and φ + ξ − φa such that equation (23) is valid. For example, let
be P (a1) = 0.9, from which we have P (b1|a1) = 0.48: thus P (a0)P (b1|a0) = 0.05. Let
us now evaluate the interference term 2
√
P (a0)P (b1|a0)P (a1)P (b1|a1)cos(φ + ξ − φa),
which is 0.3cos(φ + ξ − φa). Thus from equation (23) we have 0.241 = 0.05 + 0.439 +
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0.3cos(φ+ ξ−φa), which entails cos(φ+ ξ−φa) = −0.827. This confirms the prediction
of our model, which evidences the presence of conjunction errors for situations HL and
a strongly negative phase factor for incompatible events. In this case we have built a
pure state, but we could write more complex mixed states, manifesting the conjunction
error only with a certain probability.
6. Other fallacies
The rich mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and the interference effects
allow us to predict or explain other fallacies in the bounded-rationality regime. For
example, 1) the ordering effects, 2) the disjunction effect, 3) the conditional probability
fallacy, 4) the framing effect and 5) the uncertainty effect. We give in this final section
a brief description of these effects, which will be described in other articles.
1) In the bounded-rationality regime, the order with which we consider two
questions A and B is important (see also the case of rational ignorance [3]). Similarly
to the repeated Stern-Gerlach experiment, we ask a question relevant to the operator Â,
then a second question relevant to the non-commuting operator B̂ and finally again Â.
Equation (15) defines the probability that the result of the second question is bj , given
ai. But the third measure leads to a non-null probability P (ak → bj) for k 6= i: in other
words the third question can give a result for the observable Â different from the first.
The bounded rationality situation has manifested an irrational behavior of the agent.
The question Â has been asked two times, but what has been changed is the context.
The opinion state of the agent in the test has evidenced a contextuality effect. Thus it
has great importance, in bounded rationality, also the temporal order of the different
questions.
2) The disjunction effect is an intriguing phenomenon discovered by Tversky and
Shafir [17] with important consequences in modelling the interactions between inference
and decision. This effect, like the conjunction fallacy, considers the probabilities relevant
to two events which can be associated to two non-commuting operators. A first attempt
to give an explanation of the effect within the quantum formalism has been given by
[22], by considering the two questions relevant to two different Hilbert spaces. The
consequences of this approach are that we obtain an entangled state, but also that
the evolution of the initial state can lead to a state which contradicts the initial
information given to the agent. A new explanation of the disjunction effect will be
given in a separate paper: here we only observe that the conjunction fallacy can be
applied to show how the perceived probability P (b1) (for example) can be lower than
P (a0)P (b1|a0)+P (a1)P (b1|a1), because the interference terms like in equation (23) may
appear.
3) The framing effects may have a similar explanation of the conjunction and
disjunction effect: the interference terms in fact are able to lower the probability P (bj)
when the initial information lead to an opportune pure state in a basis relevant to a
non-commuting operator.
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4) The conditional probability fallacy is the assumption that P (aj |bi) = P (bi|aj).
In classical probability theory this is not valid in general, while in quantum mechanics
it is always true, as can be seen from equation (13).
5) Finally we make the hypothesis of the existence of an uncertainty effect, which
is a consequence of the well-known uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics. The
experimental data of [9] show that a not-null percentage of agents in the tests fails in the
implication X−and−Y |= X, Y . We argue that this percentage may change, depending
on the commutator of the associated operators X̂, Ŷ . The uncertainty principle in
Hilbert spaces with discrete dimension has been formulated in a more general form
[23]: given the uncertainty of an observable X̂ , defined as the statistical variance of the
randomly fluctuating measurement outcomes δ2(Â) = 〈Â2〉−〈Â〉2, the local uncertainty
relations [23] state that, for any set {X̂, Ŷ , Ẑ, ...} of non-commuting operators, there
exist a non-trivial limit U such that δ2(X̂) + δ2(Ŷ ) + δ2(Ẑ) + ... ≥ U . This new
form of the uncertainty principle may apply to bounded-rationality regime, leading to
predictions similar to those cited of [9]: even if we try to prepare the opinion state of
agents such that the uncertainty of X and Y is null, the sum δ2(X̂) + δ2(Ŷ ) can not be
null.
All these paradoxical effects in general are due to the usual belief that we can
assign pre-defined elements of reality to individual observables also in regime of bounded
rationality. In a classical situation, if we ask to an agent the two questions associated to
the observables Â, B̂, we can consider simultaneously the two answers (ai, bj), and we
can study the joint probability P (ai, bj). In a bounded rationality regime, instead, this
is not possible if the related observables are non-commuting. We say that the answers
to these questions can not be known contemporarily, thus giving an important limit to
the complete knowledge of the opinion state of an agent in bounded-rationality regime.
This effect in microscopic world is called quantum contextuality [15], and evidences,
for any measurement, the influence of other non-commuting observables previously
considered.
7. Conclusions
This article, addressed both to quantum physicists and to experts of cognitive
science, evidences the incompatibility of quantum formalism with Bayes’ rule of classic
probability theory, by deriving the violation of equation (18) in bounded-rationality
regime. In particular, we use mathematical objects like vector state and density matrix
to describe the opinion state of agents, and hermitian operators for the questions: in
section 4 we show that the conjunction fallacy can be explained as an interference effect
when two different questions (relevant to two non-commuting operators) are considered.
This seems to confirm the comment of [9], for which the conjunction fallacy seems to
involve failure to coordinate the logical structure of events with first impressions about
chance. The first impressions about chance may be encoded in the quantum phase,
which leads to interference effects. In fact, we have seen that state (21) do not differ
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for the statistical predictions of A, but for the presence of a phase, which gives us the
information of how the same superposition of states is considered initially by the agent.
Thus we conclude that the conjunction fallacy can be considered as a natural con-
sequence of the quantum formalism used to describe the bounded-rationality regime.
By the way, the formalism introduced does not only give an explanation of the fallacy,
but also has a predictive character: in fact, we have predicted a reverse conjunction
fallacy, for which the probability of the conjunction of two events is much less than the
probability assigned to a single event. Moreover, in section 6 we propose other effects
which are consequences of the formalism introduced.
I wish to thank Jerome Busemeyer, Peter Bruza and Daniel Osherson for making very
useful comments and suggestions.
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